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Protecting Privacy or
Enabling Invasion?:
Safeguards for Mass
Surveill ance in
Europe
by Hannah Friedrich*

In Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden and Big Brother
Watch and Others v. United Kingdom, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) created new criteria to test whether mass surveillance regimes comply
with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).1 The Swedish nonprofit human
rights litigation group, the Center for Justice, brought
a petition against Sweden in Centrum för rättvisa,
and multiple advocates for the right to digital privacy
brought a petition against the United Kingdom (UK)
in Big Brother Watch.2 The Grand Chamber handed
down both decisions on May 25, 2021. The ECtHR’s
prior surveillance case law only addressed targeted
interception, and the Court struggled to apply its
existing standards to mass surveillance regimes.3
Under a new mass surveillance test, the Court ruled
that the Swedish and UK governments were both in
violation of Article 8. However, some judges on the
* Hannah Friedrich is a 1L at Washington College of Law. She
received her undergraduate degree in English from Trinity
University. She is interested in Civil Rights, Education, and Labor
Law.
1
See Centrum för rättvisa v. Swed., App. No. 35252/08, ¶¶
1-13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-210078; Big Brother Watch and Others v. U.K., App.
Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14, and 24960/15, ¶¶ 1-14 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-210077; Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 005 E.T.S. 4.
2
Centrum för rättvisa, App. No. 35252/08 at ¶¶ 10-12; Big
Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶ 13.
3
See Zakharov v. Russ., App. No. 47143/07, ¶ 149 (December 4,
2015), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“appno”:[“47143/06”],”it
emid”:[“001-159324”]}.
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Court expressed doubt that the test will be sufficient
to enforce Article 8 protections and warn that the test
risks enabling Member states to surveil their citizens
with only nominal privacy protections.4
Article 8 of the ECHR provides persons in countries
within the Council of Europe with the right to privacy, family life, and “correspondence,” and these rights
may only be subjected to certain restrictions which
are “in accordance with law” and “necessary in a
democratic society.”5 When the petitioners originally
brought Centrum för rättvisa and Big Brother Watch
before the ECtHR in 2018, Sweden’s Signals Intelligence Act and the UK’s Tempora computer system
exploited gaps in the Court’s jurisprudence, because
neither operation targeted specific individuals.6 The
petitioners in both cases work closely with journalists
and immigrant clients, and both had concerns that
their respective countries’ surveillance regimes were
threatening journalistic sources and the security of
international communications.7 The operation of
the Tempora system in particular offered no public
transparency, and was unknown to the public until
Edward Snowden leaked its existence in 2013.8 On
appeal, the Grand Chamber recognized the gap in
case law and chose to craft the new mass surveillance
test in Big Brother Watch, subsequently applying it in
Centrum för rättvisa.9
Targeted interception case law failed to regulate the
Swedish and British mass surveillance regimes be-

See Big Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at Annex (a) ¶¶ 1417 (Lemmens, J., Vehabović, J., and Bošnjak, J., jointly concurring in part).
5
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 005 E.T.S. 4.
6
Centrum för rättvisa, App. No. 35252/08 at ¶ 4; Big Brother
Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶ 5.
7
Centrum för rättvisa, App. No. 35252/08 at ¶ 164; Big Brother
Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶ 432.
8
Big Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶¶ 282-286.
9
Centrum för rättvisa, App. No. 35252/08 at ¶¶ 268-271; Big
Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶¶ 354-357.
4
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cause its guidelines anticipate surveillance of specific
individuals.10 Mass surveillance uses selectors instead
of individual targets to narrow the scope of interception, resulting in broad information gathering.11
Selectors are specific to the type of communication,
and in the regimes at issue, the most common selectors targeted communications sent across borders.12
The new test requires the intercepting public authority to be subject to a domestic legal framework
providing safeguards at every stage of the approval,
enactment, and completion of mass surveillance.13
Supervision is intended to increase in scrutiny as
surveillance progresses through stages of information
gathering and examination.14 Surveilling states are
also required to destroy information after an appropriate time to reduce the risk of gathered information
being stolen.15
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in their lack of definite terms.18 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque suggests banning mass surveillance entirely,
and subjecting targeted interception to close judicial
oversight with specific protections for privileged
groups like journalists.19 It remains to be seen if
future jurisprudence will reverse or further refine the
loosely defined safeguards and restore the Article 8
protections currently at risk of erosion.

Although in these cases the new test was used to limit
the authority of surveilling states, the creation of any
guidelines for surveillance risks sanctifying similar
regimes. The majority Big Brother Watch opinion
focuses on prevention of mass surveillance as a
means of circumventing targeted interception restrictions, so that selectors can’t be used strategically
to surveil specific individuals.16 However, the concurring and dissenting opinions criticize the test for
vague language, lack of hard limitations, and a bias
towards Member state governments.17 The proposed
safeguards are appropriate in scope, but insufficient

See Zakharov, App. No. 47143/07 at ¶ 149 (finding that a
Russian citizen could not claim an Article 8 violation because
he could not prove that a mass surveillance regime targeted him
specifically).
11
See Big Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶¶ 322-23.
12
See Centrum för rättvisa, App. No. 35252/08 at ¶¶ 164, 171;
Big Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶ 344.
13
See Big Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶¶ 354-357.
14
Id. at ¶¶ 348-350.
15
Id. at ¶ 361.
16
Big Brother Watch, App. No. 58170/13 at ¶¶ 353-55.
17
See id. at Annex (a) ¶¶ 14-17 (Lemmens, J., Vehabović, J., and
Bošnjak, J., jointly concurring in part); Id. at Annex (b) ¶¶ 4-5,
14 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
10

See id. at Annex (b) ¶ 15 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19
See id. at Annex (b) ¶¶ 19-29 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18

